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I. INTRODUCTION
Televised sporting events are an important part of American culture.
Sports leagues and cable companies have embarked on courses of vertical
integration1 to reap the financial benefits of the public's love of sports.
These parallel courses of vertical integration clash with the FCC's carriage
regulations in a way that could cause cable prices to increase for the sports
fan and non-sports fan alike.
FCC regulations prohibit vertically integrated cable companies from
discriminating between affiliated and nonaffiliated networks. Many cable
companies have vertically integrated by acquiring interests in regional
sports networks (RSNs). A more recent phenomenon is the creation of
cable networks by college and professional sports leagues. These leagues
distribute exclusive content through vertically integrated cable networks. In
some instances, because of the high prices sought by the league-owned
networks, they have been unable to reach carriage agreements with cable
companies. The league-owned networks could argue that cable companies
are in violation of the FCC's anti-discrimination regulations by carrying
their affiliated RSNs on favorable terms, but denying carriage to
nonaffiliated league-owned sports networks.
1. "Vertical integration" occurs when several stages of production (e.g., producing,
processing, distributing, and marketing) are brought together in one company. 58 AM. JUR.
2D Newspapers § 71 (2008).
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This Note will argue that it would be an abuse of the FCC's
regulations and against the public interest for league-owned sports
networks to gain favorable carriage terms by using the anti-discrimination
regulations. Sports content is expensive, and if the bargaining power of
cable companies is hampered by the FCC's regulations, cable subscribers
will face unreasonable price increases. The recent settlement of a carriage
dispute between TCR, a cable network owned by a sports team, and
Comcast, a cable company, resulted in a $2 per month increase in cable
rates for 1.6 million people. If other league-owned sports networks are able
to obtain similar results in their negotiations, cable subscribers, many of
whom have no interest in sports programming, will face similar price
increases. Despite the fact that forcing cable companies to add expensive
sports networks would be against the interest of the majority of cable
subscribers, the FCC has held that it is unreasonable, and therefore
prohibited, for cable companies to deny carriage to expensive nonaffiliated
sports networks.
This Note will discuss a variety of possible responses by
policymakers. Congress could intervene by discouraging vertical
integration by cable companies or moving to an A la carte cable regime.
The FCC could respond independently by making clear that its regulations
only prevent unreasonable discrimination, and that discrimination by cable
companies that is consistent with the public interest is not prohibited. One
proposed solution to carriage negotiation impasses, mandatory binding
arbitration, is an unwise idea because it unjustifiably involves the
government in carriage disputes that do not result from discrimination or
coercion.
II. LEAGUE-OWNED NETWORKS AND REGIONAL SPORTS
NETWORKS
A. Background: Cable Sports and Vertical Integration
Sports are a big business. The National Football League (NFL) earns
$3.7 billion annually by selling broadcast rights to its football games.2
ESPN is able to command a broadcast license fee of $3.26 per subscriber
from cable companies; YES, the network owned by George Steinbrenner
which owns the rights to broadcast games played by the New York
Yankees, 3 commands a $2.15 monthly license fee per subscriber.4 By
2. Peter Grant & Adam Thompson, NFL Network Gets Blocked as Cable Takes Tough
Stance, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2007, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB1 18756679294202415.html.
3. Richard Sandomir, A Stake in the YES Network Is on the Market, but Not the
Yankees' Share, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at D5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
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contrast, other major cable networks like USA, CNN, or TBS charge about
$0.30 per subscriber per month.5 The disparity is reflective of the
importance of sports media. In an age of short attention spans and a
multitude of media competing for consumer attention, broadcasters are
willing to pay a premium for sports programming because of its unique
ability to command a viewer's attention.6
Sports leagues have attempted to capture the financial benefits of
cable sports by creating vertically integrated cable networks and reserving
a portion of the league's content to be exclusively broadcast on that
network.7 Cable companies have also pursued a vertical integration strategy
by creating or acquiring interests in RSNs.8 RSNs provide sports
programming relevant to a particular geographic area.9
B. The Roots of the Dispute Between Cable Companies and
League-Owned Networks
The trend of vertical integration between (1) sports leagues and sports
networks,' ° and (2) cable companies and sports networks" has caused
problems in negotiations between league-owned networks seeking carriage
and cable companies. 12 The root of the dispute concerns whether the
league-owned networks should be placed on the expanded basic tier or a
special tier of service.
Cable companies are required to offer a "basic" service tier which
subscribers must purchase in order to have access to other cable
programming. 13 The FCC requires that the basic tier include local broadcast
2007/08/03/sports/baseball/03yes.html?-r=1 &n=Top/News/Business/Companies/Goldman
%20Sachs%20Group%20Inc.&oref=-slogin.
4. Grant & Thompson, supra note 2.
5. Joe Nocera, Of Tiers, Football and Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at Cl,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/06/business/06nocera.html.
6. See id.
7. See generally id.
8. Ronald Grover, Tom Lowry & William C. Symonds, Rumble in Regional Sports,
Bus. WEEK, Nov. 22, 2004, at 156, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/
content/04 47/b3909143 mz016.htm.
9. See Staci D. Kramer, Empire Building. Regional Sports Networks Require Rabid
Local Fans, Red-Hot Teams and a Break from an ASO, CABLE WORLD, Mar. 25, 2002, at
18, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articies/mimODIZ/is_12_14/ai_84593510.
10. For example, the NFL, Big Ten, and the NBA have such integration. See Grant &
Thompson, supra note 2.
11. For example, Comcast with Versus have such integration. See Nocera, supra note 5.
12. See id.
13. Choosing Cable Channels, FCC Consumer Facts, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/
consumerfacts/cablechannels.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009); see also Thomas Hazlitt,
Shedding Tiers for a la Carte? An Economic Analysis of Cable TV Pricing, 5 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH L. 253, 255 n.2 (2006).
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networks and whatever public, educational, and governmental access
channels local government requires.' 4 Additional programming, including
news, sports, and "superstations," is placed on expanded basic tiers--the
level of cable service that most subscribers choose. Cable companies have
increased the number of channels they broadcast on the expanded basic
tier, but that expansion has been blamed for increases in price that are not
justified by the viewership of those channels.15 Special tiers carry
programming that may be purchased separately on an A la carte basis.'
6
Cable companies argue that the league-owned networks are asking a
price that is too high compared to the value of the content they provide and
refuse to provide carriage on their expanded basic service tiers.17 Instead,
they offer to carry the league-owned networks on special tiers.
18
League-owned networks, drawn into the television business by the
prospect of fat subscriber fees, find the idea of placement on a special tier
unacceptable. 19 Not only would revenue drawn from subscribers be lower,
advertising would be more difficult to sell.20 The league-owned networks
point to the cable-owned RSNs, which are just as expensive in terms of
license fees2' and are placed on expanded basic service tiers, as evidence of
the value of sports programming to cable companies.
C. Public Negotiations Between Cable Companies and League-
Owned Networks
Cable companies and sports networks are vying for support in the
political arena, as well as in the court of public opinion in an attempt to
influence negotiations. In December of 2007, the New England Patriots
football team took an undefeated record into the last week of the regular
14. See id.
15. Increasing Cable Prices Justify Focus on Market, Martin Says, TELECOMM. REP.,
Jan. 1, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 1677 (Westlaw).
16. See, e.g., Bill Freehling, Football Fans Don't Have Access to Big Cowboys-Packers
Showdown, THE FREE-LANCE STAR, Nov. 29, 2007, 2007 WLNR 23682952; see also Big
Game, Small TV Audience, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Nov. 29, 2007, 2007 WLNR
25884919; Comcast Holds Line in Big Ten Standoff: Cable Provider, Big Ten Network
Continue Very Public Battle, THE STAR-TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 2007, 2007 WLNR 20326929.
17. See, e.g., Tom Miller, Network, Cable Providers Clash on Channel Placement,
JANESVILLE GAZETTE (Wis.), Nov. 2, 2007, available at http://gazettextra.com/
news/2007/nov/02/cable-battles-big-ten-network/.
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., id.
20. See, e.g., id.
21. Andy Grossman, Regional Sports Networks: Cable's Ace in the Hole?, CABLE
WORLD MAG., July 17, 2006, available at http://www.cable360.net/cableworld/business/
marketing/16433.html.
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season to play the New York Giants; it was a game of national interest.22
The game was scheduled for broadcast on the NFL Network, which was, at
the time, not available on the basic expanded tier of most major cable
companies.23
The NFL lobbied Congress to intervene on its behalf to the FCC but
was unsuccessful.24 In fact, the lobbying seemed to backfire. Despite the
NFL's efforts, many in Congress were more sympathetic toward the cable
companies in the dispute. Senator John Kerry threatened to hold hearings
in the Senate Commerce Committee if the NFL Network did not back
down and allow wider distribution of the game.
26
More generally, the NFL Network has also explored the possibility of
filing a complaint with the FCC. 27 The NFL's legal theory is that cable
companies are favoring RSNs, in which they have an interest, and denying
carriage on similar terms to nonaffiliated networks.28 Cable companies are
prohibited from discriminating between affiliated and nonaffiliated
networks in carriage terms. 29 The sports networks would like to be able to
use this law to force their way on to the expanded basic service tier
alongside the cable-owned RSNs.
Outside the political realm, cable companies have affiliated
themselves with Web pages30 and run commercials 31 targeted at sports fans
suggesting that the sports networks are greedy and dishonest, and that the
content they provide is not valuable. The sports networks have also run ads
designed to motivate fans to pressure their cable company into adding their
network.32
22. The importance of this game to football fans was that, if the Patriots won, they
would become the first NFL team to go 16-0 in the regular season. Only one other NFL
team had ever accomplished this feat; the 1972 Miami Dolphins. Pats' Year of Perfection
Capped by Thrilling Comeback Win Over Giants, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/recap?gameld=271229019 (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
23. NFL Hill Lobbying on Cable Dispute May Have Backfired, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 28,
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 25765763 (Westlaw).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. (Kerry addressed a letter to NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell suggesting
that if the game was not aired, he would ask the committee to "examine 'how the emergence
of premium sports channels' affects consumers.").
27. See Nocera, supra note 5.
28. See id.
29. See 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3) (2000).
30. See, e.g., About Us, Putting Fans First, http://www.puttingfansfirst.org/pubs/
aboutus.cfin (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (stating that Comcast provides corporate support).
31. Comcast vs. Big Ten Network (Comcast TV commercial), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xw3B9ooYCBO&feature=related (arguing that the Big
Ten Network should be a "choice" that not everyone should have to pay for).
32. See, e.g., NFL Network Commercial (NFL Network TV commercial), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ydMxblA3Qx4 (responding to the argument that people
should not have to pay for channels they do not want).
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III. THE FCC'S CARRIAGE DISCRIMINATION REGULATIONS
In the 1992 Cable Act, Congress directed the FCC to adopt
regulations prohibiting cable companies from discriminating in carriage
agreements between affiliated and nonaffiliated networks.3 3 The carriage
anti-discrimination laws were adopted to prevent a network from gaining
too much market power over nonaffiliated networks.34 Congress provided
room in the statutory language for the FCC to enforce the anti-
discrimination law in a way that is consistent with the public interest.
35
Unfortunately, both the process by which carriage discrimination
complaints are reviewed by the FCC and the language of the decision in
TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding, LLP v. Comcast Corp. 36 make it
unclear whether the FCC will enforce those laws in a way that benefits the
public. The uncertainty seems to work to the advantage of the nonaffiliated
sports networks. If the FCC's carriage regulations are not enforced in a way
that is consistent with the public interest, cable rates will rise and non-
sports fans will be the big losers.
A. Carriage Discrimination Regulation in the 1992 Cable Act &
Analysis of the FCC's Implementation
As part of the 1992 Cable Act, Congress directed the FCC to
promulgate regulations that prohibited cable companies from (1) requiring
a financial interest in a network as a condition of carriage, (2) coercing the
nonaffiliated networks into providing the cable company exclusive rights to
programming, and (3) restraining the ability of nonaffiliated networks to
compete by discriminating in favor of affiliated networks in carriage
agreements.37 A network is deemed affiliated if the cable company owns a
five percent or greater share in the network.38
33. 47 U.S.C. § 536(a) (2000).
34. See discussion infra Part III.A.
35. See discussion infra Part V.C.
36. TCR Sports Broad. Holding v. Comcast Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Hearing
Designation Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8989 (2006) [hereinafter TCR Order].
37. § 536(a). The statute reads:
(a) Regulations[:] Within one year after October 5, 1992, the Commission shall
establish regulations governing program carriage agreements and related practices
between cable operators or other multichannel video programming distributors
and video programming vendors. Such regulations shall--
(1) include provisions designed to prevent a cable operator or other
multichannel video programming distributor from requiring a financial interest in
a program service as a condition for carriage on one or more of such operator's
systems;
(2) include provisions designed to prohibit a cable operator or other
multichannel video programming distributor from coercing a video programming
vendor to provide, and from retaliating against such a vendor for failing to
provide, exclusive rights against other multichannel video programming
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 61
The statute was adopted in response to concern that increasing
horizontal and vertical integration in the cable industry gave cable
companies too much market power.39 Specifically, Congress was concerned
that vertically integrated cable operators would favor affiliated
programmers at the expense of nonaffiliated programmers, and that cable
operators would limit access to their affiliated programmers to cable (as
opposed to satellite).40 The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation recognized in the Senate Report accompanying the 1992
Cable Act that differences between networks would necessitate differing
terms in carriage agreements, and that there should be flexibility in carriage
agreement negotiations as long as it did not impede competition. 41 The
Committee also recognized that the exercise of market power by vertically
integrated cable companies would not be a cause of concern in all
situations.42
The FCC adopted regulations mirroring the statutory language.43 In
adopting the regulations, the FCC declined to prohibit specific conduct in
distributors as a condition of carriage on a system;
(3) contain provisions designed to prevent a multichannel video programming
distributor from engaging in conduct the effect of which is to unreasonably
restrain the ability of an unaffiliated video programming vendor to compete fairly
by discriminating in video programming distribution on the basis of affiliation or
nonaffiliation of vendors in the selection, terms, or conditions for carriage of
video programming provided by such vendors[.]
Id.
38. Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992: Development of Competition and Diversity in Video
Programming Distribution and Carriage, Second Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 2642, para.
19 (1994) [hereinafter Competition and Diversity in Video Distribution and Carriage].
39. Id. atpara2.
40. S. Rep. 102-92, at 25-26 (1992).
41. Id.
42. The Committee's report stated,
The Committee understands that there are many other factors that affect the
bargaining between the programmer and the cable operator. As was stated earlier,
the extent of market power in the cable industry varies in each locality. In
addition, there are certain major programmers that are more able to fend for
themselves. It is difficult to believe a cable system would not carry the sports
channel, ESPN, or the news channel, CNN. In addition, the cable operator has an
incentive to put on programming that increases subscribership and decreases
chum. These factors counterbalance some of the Committee's concerns regarding
the market power of the cable operator vis-a-vis the programmer. However, the
Committee continues to believe that the operator in certain instances can abuse its
locally-derived market power to the detriment of programmers and competitors.
The provisions adopted in the legislation reflect that concern.
Id. at 24.
43. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.1301 (2007). The FCC's rule reads:
(a) Financial interest. No cable operator or other multichannel video programming
distributor shall require a financial interest in any program service as a condition
for carriage on one or more of such operator's/provider's systems.
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negotiating carriage agreements, but reasoned that regulations mirroring the
statutory language were appropriate because "[carriage discrimination]
complaints will necessarily focus on the specific facts pertaining to each
negotiation, and the manner in which certain rights were obtained, to
determine whether a violation has, in fact, occurred." 44 The FCC did,
however, list suggestions of behavior made by commenting parties as
"useful guidelines for case-by-case inquiry. '45
Pursuant to another provision of the 1992 Cable Act,46 the FCC's
implementation order also established expedited procedures for handling
(b) Exclusive rights. No cable operator or other multichannel video programming
distributor shall coerce any video programming vendor to provide, or retaliate
against such a vendor for failing to provide, exclusive rights against any other
multichannel video programming distributor as a condition for carriage on a
system.
(c) Discrimination. No multichannel video programming distributor shall engage
in conduct the effect of which is to unreasonably restrain the ability of an
unaffiliated video programming vendor to compete fairly by discriminating in
video programming distribution on the basis of affiliation or nonaffiliation of
vendors in the selection, terms, or conditions for carriage of video programming
provided by such vendors.
Id.
44. Competition and Diversity in Video Distribution and Carriage, supra note 38, at
para. 14.
45. Id. at para. 17. For § 536(a)(2) coercion, the statute requires:
(1) refusals to carry a service on terms and conditions that are reasonable or
standard in the industry for comparable programming; (2) patterns of conduct
during the course of dealing between the parties; (3) market dominance by a
distributor obtaining exclusivity or ownership, or the absence of a comparable
alternative distributor; and (4) the timing of agreement on financial interests or
exclusivity relative to the agreement on carriage.
47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(2). For § 536(a)(3) discrimination, the statue requires:
(a) a refusal to carry an unaffiliated service without reasonable business
justification; (b) assignment of significantly inferior channel positioning, or other
type of inaccessibility to subscribers, as compared to competing affiliated services
added to the system during the same time period; (c) unwillingness to engage in
promotional support, cooperative advertising, or other similar activity performed
for comparable affiliated services, without a reasonable business justification; (d)
willingness to sell subscriber lists and addresses and other data useful in
promotional activity only to affiliated programmers; (e) excluding unaffiliated
programming services from mention in standard presentations to potential
subscribers, when affiliated services are named; (f) requiring that unaffiliated
services waive rights not waived by any comparable affiliated or unaffiliated
service; (g) higher monthly payments to affiliated services than to comparable
unaffiliated services without reasonable business justification; (h) imposing more
onerous technical quality standards or requirements on an unaffiliated service; and
(i) refusing to include a nonaffiliated service in comparable discount packages to
those in which comparable affiliated services are offered to subscribers, without a
reasonable business justification.
Competition and Diversity in Video Distribution and Carriage, supra note 38, at para. 13.
46. 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(4) (2000).
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complaints of violations of regulations. 47 After giving notice to the cable
company, a network may file a complaint with the FCC with a request for
relief.48 The complaint, answer, and reply (and no additional pleadings)
will first be reviewed by the staff to ensure the establishment of a prima
facie case that one of the FCC's regulations has been violated.49 The
complaint must allege with specificity the behaviors that the network
claims violate the FCC's regulations.50 If this burden is met, most often the
parties will be given the choice to submit to alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) or submit factual disputes to an administrative law judge (ALJ).5'
The decision of the ALJ is appealable to the FCC.52 The remedies available
to a programming vendor include forfeiture, mandatory carriage, or
modification of an existing carriage agreement. 3
The most important step of the complaint process seems to be the
initial review of the complaint for a prima facie case. Since the FCC has
declined to define with specificity the type of behaviors prohibited by the
regulations, a determination that a complaint's allegations are sufficient to
state a prima facie case is a significant victory for the complainant. A
conclusion by the staff that the complaint alleges a prima facie case affirms
that the allegations of the complainant are legally sufficient to go forward
for further adjudication in front of an ALJ. Since the regulations are not
specific and there is little case law, whether particular conduct in carriage
negotiations is discriminatory would almost never be certain until the prima
facie determination by the FCC is made.
In both cases discussed below, settlements favorable to the
complainant occurred after the FCC determined that the complainant stated
a prima facie case.54 The lack of clarity (on the rather substantial margins)
as to what type of behavior is prohibited by regulations leads to the
necessity of an initial round of litigation to determine and clarify the law
itself. The inability of negotiating parties to determine prospectively if they
are engaging in illegal conduct is a problem that leads to pointless
litigation.
47. See Competition and Diversity in Video Distribution and Carriage, supra note 38,
at paras. 29-34.
48. Id. at para. 26.
49. Id. at para. 23.
50. Id.
51. Id. at para. 24.
52. Id.
53. Id. at para. 26.
54. See Classic Sports Network, Inc. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., Memorandum Opinion
and Hearing Designation Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 10288 (1997); see also TCR Order, supra
note 36 (discussed in more detail at infra Parts III.B., III.C.).
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Another problem with the current complaint procedure is that it does
not allow a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint before submitting to
the findings and conclusions of an ALJ. Even if a complaint holds up under
prima facie review, there are situations in which a defendant should be able
to show that the complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law.5 5 The
discrimination prohibited by law is discrimination that unreasonably
restrains competition; presumably, if the defendant could show that the
discrimination was reasonable, the case should be dismissed despite a
prima facie showing of discrimination. Because the usual result of prima
facie review seems to drive parties to settle, the inability of a defendant to
argue for pre-review dismissal seems to be a significant and unjustified
advantage for complainants.
B. Classic Sports Network v. Cablevision
The first complaint made under the FCC's carriage agreement
regulations was made in 1997 by Classic Sports Network (Classic) against
Cablevision.5 6 Classic, an independent cable network broadcasting vintage
sporting events, complained that Cablevision, a cable company with, at the
time, 2.8 million subscribers, used coercive bargaining tactics to require an
ownership stake in the network as a condition of carriage." Classic claimed
that, in negotiations, Cablevision CEO James Dolan demanded an equity
stake in Classic in exchange for carriage. 58
Without discussion of the contents of the complaint, the Cable
Services Bureau found that the complaint established a prima facie case
and ordered the parties to resolve their dispute out of court or submit to the
factual finding of an ALJ.59 The parties soon settled out of court with
Cablevision claiming that it made no concessions and Classic claiming that
it received more-than-expected "consideration."60 The dispute between the
parties presumably was mooted by the sale of Classic to ESPN.6 1
55. See 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3) (2000).
56. Mark Landler, Distribution Dispute Ensnarls Cablevision and Classic Sports, N.Y.




59. Classic Sports Network, Inc. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Hearing Designation Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 10288, paras. 6-7 (1997).
60. See Richard Sandomir, Plus: TV Sports; Settlement Reached in Cable Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1997, at C5, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9F03E6D8163EF933A 575 1C 1 A961958260.
61. See Richard Sandomir, Disney's ESPN Unit Buying Classic Sports Programmer,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1997, at D7, available at http://query.nytimes.corngst/
fullpage.html?res=9BO4EEDB 1530F937A3575ACOA961958260.
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C. TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding v. Comcast
The first case addressing discriminatory treatment by a cable
company of an unaffiliated network prohibited by the 1992 Cable Act
62
was filed in 2006. The dispute in that case arose out of an agreement made
between Peter Angelos, the owner of the Baltimore Orioles baseball team,
and Major League Baseball (MLB). Angelos was unhappy with the
decision of MLB to allow the Washington Nationals baseball team to move
from Montreal to Washington D.C., a move Angelos felt would diminish
his team's market.63 To get Angelos to go along with the move, MLB (then
the owner of the Nationals) granted TCR, the RSN controlled by the
Orioles, the exclusive broadcasting rights to Nationals games.64 TCR was
to begin broadcasting Nationals games in 2006 and Orioles games in
2007.65
Comcast, a cable company, owned an RSN that had exclusive rights
to broadcast Orioles games through 2006.66 Comcast refused to carry TCR,
and sued in state court claiming that by proposing carriage, the Orioles
violated their existing broadcasting agreement with Comcast, which
Comcast claimed gave it a right of first refusal to broadcasting rights to
Orioles games in subsequent years.67 Meanwhile, public dismay at the lack
of television broadcast for Nationals games led the chairman of the House
Government Reform Committee to hold hearings on the subject and call for
the FCC to intervene.68
TCR also filed a complaint with the FCC that alleged violations of the
FCC's coercion and discrimination regulations, 69 and requested the FCC to
require carriage on Comcast under the same terms and conditions it had
reached with other cable companies, or under "just and reasonable" terms.70
The FCC reviewed the complaint for sufficiency and issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Hearing Designation Order.71
62. 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3) (2000).
63. See Richard Sandomir, Beltway Cable Dispute: Fans Paying the Price, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 28, 2005, at D2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/28/sports/baseball/
28sandomir.html?_r=1 &oref=slogin.
64. TCR Order, supra note 36, para. 5. The TCR network did business under the name
"Mid-Atlantic Sports Network" or "MASN."
65. Id. at para. 6.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Tim Lemke, Nats Games to Air on Comcast Cable; Deal with Network Ends
Dispute, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2006, at Al, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi hb5244/is /ai n19655862.
69. The regulations are at 47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(a)-(c) (2008).
70. TCR Order, supra note 36, at para. 7.
71. Id.
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TCR alleged on the coercion claim that Greenberg, an investment
banker purporting to act on behalf of MLB, demanded a financial interest
for Comcast in TCR's network.72 Comcast and Greenberg denied that he
was acting on Comcast's behalf.73 The FCC held that "TCR [] presented
sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing that Comcast indirectly
"174and improperly demanded a financial interest ....
TCR also alleged that Comcast engaged in discrimination in violation
of the 1992 Cable Act by continuing to carry its RSN (Classic), and
refusing to carry TCR in retaliation for MLB's awarding of Nationals
broadcast rights to TCR.75 TCR claimed that, without carriage on Comcast,
it would be impossible for its network to achieve the level of subscribership
it needed to be financially viable.76
Comcast asserted that the refusal to carry TCR's network was based
on (1) the pending lawsuit arising out of Comcast's claim that TCR
violated a contractual right of first refusal, (2) a concern that carriage of
TCR's network would displace programming already carried by Comcast,
and (3) the type of programming (other than baseball) that would otherwise
be carried on TCR's network.77 The reviewing staff of the FCC held that
this allegation was enough to state a prima facie case.7 8
In its discussion of TCR's discrimination allegations, the Order
stated:
TCR argues that without carriage by Comcast, it will be impossible for
MASN to reach the necessary level of subscribership to achieve long-
term financial viability, and that Comcast's refusal to carry MASN
thus restrains TCR from competing fairly.
79
In finding TCR's allegation legally sufficient, the FCC implicitly held that
that discrimination that causes a network to be unable to achieve "long-
term financial viability" meets the standard for discrimination prohibited by
47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(c), that is, discrimination "the effect of which is to
unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated video programming
vendor to compete fairly.
80
Since TCR met its burden to show a prima facie case, the FCC
directed the parties to resolve their dispute through ADR or submit to a
72. Id. at para. 9.
73. Thomas Heath, FCC Asked by O's to Rule on Nats TV Stalemate, WASH. POST, June
15, 2005, at El, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/06/14/AR2005061401114.html.
74. TCR Order, supra note 36, at par. 10 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at para. 11.
76. Id.
77. Id. atparas. 6-12.
78. Id at para. 12.
79. Id. atpara. 11.
80. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(c) (2008) (emphasis added).
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factual hearing before an ALJ.8 1 Less than a week after the FCC's order
was issued, the parties agreed to a settlement.82 Comcast agreed to carry
TCR's network in exchange for a five percent reduction in its carriage
price. 3 Even with the rate reduction, TCR received $1.35 per subscriber
per month, 4 which led summarily to a $2 increase in cable rates for the 1.6
million customers to whom TCR sought access.8 5
D. Movement Within the FCC for Change to the Discrimination
Regulations
The FCC recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
addressing procedures used in carriage complaints.8 6 The FCC sought
comment on whether the elements of a prima facie case should be clarified,
whether timelines imposed on the resolution of the complaint process are
effective, whether the complaint process should be overhauled, and
whether and how independent cable networks should be able to negotiate
for nationwide access (as opposed to system-by-system access) with
multiple system cable operators.8 7
The FCC's request for comment as to whether the elements of a prima
facie case of discrimination should be clarified is particularly interesting in
light of the FCC's initial hesitance to define discriminatory conduct in
detail. The FCC's previous approach was to define that behavior as
particular complaints were resolved. 8 This approach was exactly what
caused the initial review of carriage complaints to be so crucial as a
threshold matter in carriage negotiation disputes.
8 9
The NFL Network has lobbied for an approach which would subject
carriage disputes to arbitration, even if the complaint does not allege
81. See TCR Order, supra note 36, at paras. 16-23.
82. See Lemke, supra note 68.
83. Id.
84. Ted Hearn, et al., Through the Wire, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Aug. 7, 2006, at 33,
available at 2006 WLNR 13625827 (Westlaw).
85. Ted Hearn, Roberts: Let's Talk Sports: Comcast CEO Wants Industry Dialogue on
Channel Costs, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 25, 2006, at 6, available at 2006 WLNR
16600768 (Westlaw).
86. Leased Commercial Access: Development of Competition and Diversity in Video
Programming Distribution and Carriage, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R.
112 22 paras. 14-18 (2007).
87. Id.
88. See Competition and Diversity in Video Distribution and Carriage, supra note 38,
at para. 14.
89. For example, if the NFL Network and Comcast were entering negotiations under
TCR, it is clear that a cable operator may not discriminate between an affiliated RSN and a
nonaffiliated RSN. If the sports network is not an RSN, however, the regulation's lack of
clarity might result in long rounds of negotiations.
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discrimination.9" This is an approach that former Commissioner Kevin
Martin, along with twenty one members of Congress, supported.9' When
asked by the House Telecommunications Subcommittee whether the FCC
had authority to do this, Martin oddly pointed to the TCR Order dispute for
support for his position that the FCC had such authority. Of course, in that
case, TCR alleged discrimination. The NFL's proposal would only require
a carriage dispute to require mandatory arbitration between the parties.92
Other commissioners questioned by the House Telecommunications
Subcommittee said that they thought the FCC only has authority to arbitrate
when a vertically integrated cable company was discriminating against a
nonaffiliated network.93 The latter view seems to be a more accurate
statement of the FCC's current regulations.
IV. THE FCC's CARRIAGE REGULATIONS ARE RIPE TO BE
EXPLOITED BY LEAGUED-OWNED CABLE SPORTS NETWORKS IN
A WAY THAT IS HARMFUL TO THE PUBLIC
A. How Could League-Owned Cable Sports Networks Exploit the
FCC's Regulations for Leverage in Carriage Negotiations?
The statute and regulations governing carriage agreements were
adopted to prohibit unreasonable discrimination and promote competition.
League-owned nonaffiliated networks will argue that the TCR v. Comcast
decision should be read as requiring that any cable company with an
affiliated RSN provide carriage on relatively equal terms (at least in terms
of subscription tier) with other sports networks if failure to do so would
make it "impossible for [the nonaffiliated network] to reach the necessary
level of subscribership to achieve long-term financial viability."94 Thus, the
argument would be that any cable company that owns an RSN on an
expanded basic tier must provide access to the league-owned nonaffiliated
networks on the same tier.
While the TCR Order did not provide extensive reasoning for the
FCC's decision (probably because of the procedural posture of the case),
the league-owned nonaffiliated networks' position has support. The
policies behind the anti-discrimination legislation were the promotion of
90. See Hot Seat: Martin Defends Cap, Dingell Says FCC Appears Broke, CABLEFAX
DAILY, Dec. 6, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 24107394 (Westlaw).
91. See Jonathan Make, NFL Hill Lobbying on Cable Dispute May Have Backfired,
COMM. DAILY, Dec. 28, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 25765763 (Westlaw).
92. See Tim Lenke, No Resolution Yet to NFL Network Dispute, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2007, http://videol.washingtontimes.com/sportsbiz/2007/11/no_resolution.yet_tonfl-net
wo.html.
93. Hot Seat, supra note 90.
94. TCR Order, supra note 36, at para 11.
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diversity in programming and the prohibition of vertically integrated cable
programmers from favoring their affiliated networks.95 The prohibition on
discrimination was enacted to promote competition in the market for cable
programming.
96
League-owned cable sports networks like the Big Ten Network can
claim that their presence on basic expanded tiers of service will increase
competition in, and diversity of, sports programming. Since ABC's ESPN
is by far the dominant sports network, networks like the Big Ten Network
and NFL Network serve to increase much-needed competition in the sports
broadcasting business. In terms of diversity in sports programming, the Big
Ten Network carries more women's sports, and other less popular college
sports-such as baseball, soccer, tennis, volleyball, swimming, and diving-
than other sports networks.97
Congress intended that the effect of the discrimination by the
vertically integrated cable companies on competitors in the network
business be an important means of distinguishing prohibited discrimination
from non-prohibited discrimination.98 Congress clearly intended to prohibit
discrimination that would harm competitors, and it meant for the FCC to
pay attention to the effects of discrimination in determining whether the
discrimination was prohibited. The TCR Order seems to conclude that the
effect of discrimination is unreasonable if a network would not be
"financially viable" if not placed on the expanded basic tier, a cable
company with an RSN on the basic expanded tier must provide equal
access.
99
Sports networks like the Big Ten Network and the NFL Network can
make a good argument that their financial viability requires placement on a
basic expanded tier of programming. As noted above, placement on a
sports tier would adversely affect subscriber fees and advertising
revenue.'00 Since almost any network could argue that there will be far
fewer subscribers who would pay for their network separately on a special
tier, almost any new sports network could argue that its financial viability
95. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385 § 2(b) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 521(b) (2000)).
96. S. REP. No. 102-92, at 1 (1991).
97. See Press Release, Big Ten Announces Commitment to Event Equality for Men and
Women on the Big Ten Network (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.bigtennetwork
.com/corporate/PR62107.asp.
98. See S. REP. No. 102-92 at 28 ("[R]elevant factors include the degree and duration of
the difference and the effect of the difference on disfavored distributors."); see also 47
U.S.C. § 536(a)(3) (2000) (directing the FCC to promulgate regulations "to prevent a
multichannel video programming distributor from engaging in conduct the effect of which is
to unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated... vendor to compete fairly").
99. TCR Order, supra note 36, at para 11.
100. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
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depends on placement on the basic expanded tier. If the league-owned
networks can successfully allege unreasonable discrimination by showing
that their placement on a special tier would affect their financial viability, it
will provide them with a great deal of leverage in carriage negotiations
before litigation ever commences.
B. Exploitation of the FCC's Regulations by League-Owned Cable
Sports Networks Could Lead to Unreasonable Price Increases for
Cable Subscribers
For a multitude of reasons, cable price increases already significantly
outpace the rate of inflation.10' The FCC's carriage discrimination
regulations are an issue of particular public interest because the price
increases associated with the addition of new sports networks on the basic
expanded tier will cause cable prices to rise even faster. 0 2 Furthermore,
these price increases will not be associated with significant increases in
service to subscribers. League-owned sports networks will serve niche
audiences of sports fans, and, while diversity in sports broadcasting may be
increased, in a broader sense, diversity in broadcasting will not be affected
as more sports networks are added to the basic expanded tier of service.
As things stand, the trend of sports leagues starting networks does not
seem likely to cease. Presently, some college sports conferences like the
Big Ten and Mountain West conferences' 0 3 have their own networks. The
Southeastern Conference (SEC)' 4 and the Big 12 Conference 10 5 are also
exploring the idea of their own respective networks. MLB is launching a
network in 2009,106 the National Basketball Association (NBA) and
National Hockey League (NHL) have networks available on sports tiers. 0 7
101. See generally Implementation of Section 621(A)(1) of the Cable Comms. Policy
Act of 1984 as Amended by the Cable TV Consumer Protection & Competition Act of
1992, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 5101
(2007).
102. See Hearn, Roberts: Let's Talk Sports, supra note 85 (stating that TCR's settlement
resulted in a $2 per subscriber increase for Comeast subscribers).
103. See Glenn Guilbeau, SEC Explores Launching its own TV Network, USA TODAY,
June 9, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/sec/2007-06-09-tv-network_
N.htm/.
104. Id.
105. See Statement from Bill Byrne, Dir. of Athletics, Texas A&M Univ., Why No TV
or PPV . . . Concrete Covering Update, (on file at http://www.aggieathletics.com/genrel/
101806aaa.html).
106. See Danielle Sessa, MLB Network Will Broadcast 26 Games When it Debuts in
2009, BLOOMBERG (Seattle), May 17, 2007, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/
baseball/316238_baseballtvl8.html.
107. See Jon Lafayette, NHL Network Picked up by Major U.S. Cable, Satellite
Distributors, TV WEEK, Oct. 8, 2007, available at http://www.tvweek.com/news/2007/10/
nhlnetworkjpickedup bymajor.php; see also Evan Weiner, NHL Needs to Broaden
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If all of these networks were placed on a basic expanded tier, and all
resulted in price increases as great as the one TCR caused, cable
subscribers would face a $10 increase in their monthly cable bills.
The vulnerability of cable companies to carriage discrimination
complaints is just another incentive for leagues to create their own sports
networks. Many cable companies own RSNs. 10 8 If league-owned cable
sports networks are able to use the FCC's discrimination regulations as
leverage to get carriage at a high price on the expanded basic tier of cable
service, it will be difficult for cable companies that own RSNs to negotiate
with those networks in a way that keeps prices reasonable for subscribers.
V. SOLUTIONS
In light of the problems that exploitation of the FCC's carriage
regulations pose to the public interest (discussed above),'09 policymakers
should consider a response. The long-term outcome of carriage agreements
negotiated under the current regulations will be unfair cable prices for
consumers. The higher prices will not result in enhanced levels of service
or significant increases in diversity or competition in cable programming.
First, the problem could be addressed through a legislative response to
discourage vertical integration by cable companies (although the same
result may also be achieved through a non-interventionist approach).
Second, if Congress and the FCC move toward an A la carte cable regime,
the issue may become irrelevant. Third, the FCC could take action
independently by clarifying that the TCR Order and the FCC's regulations
need not and should not be read to prohibit vertically integrated cable
companies with RSNs from denying league-owned networks access to their
basic expanded tiers if it is reasonable to do so.
A. Force Divestiture of RSNs by Cable Companies Through
Intervention or Non-Intervention
Since the issue of discrimination by cable companies results from
their ownership of RSNs, a possible solution is for Congress to discourage
or prohibit vertical integration by cable companies. If cable companies did
not own RSNs, there would presumably be no problem if the company
decided to deny carriage to an expensive cable sports network.
Furthermore, that business decision could presumably be made without a
conflict of interest-the cable company would not be competing with the
outside network. If the network provided a value to consumers for which
Cable Scope for Future, N.Y. SuN, Aug. 10, 2007, available at http://www.nysun.com/
article/60260?page no=2.
108. See generally, KaiserBlog, http://www.kaiserblog.blogspot.com (Apr. 11, 2008).
109. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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the cable company could reasonably raise rates, then the parties could reach
a carriage agreement; if it was not a good value, FCC rules would not
prohibit the provider from denying carriage on the basic/expanded tier. The
interventionist approach is unlikely to be adopted if free-market orientation
of recent telecommunications policy continues.
The non-interventionist approach to causing divestiture of RSNs by
cable companies would be for the FCC to enforce the rules as they are and
force cable companies to make the decision to divest on their own. Cable
companies faced with a decision between (1) carrying expensive sports
channels that they do not want to carry and charging a price to subscribers
that could drive them to competitors or substitutes, and (2) divesting
themselves of an RSN, it seems that any rational cable company would
choose to divest.
Simplicity is a benefit of the non-interventionist approach. If carriage
of league-owned sports networks truly poses a threat to the viability of
cable networks, the result will be the same as forcing divestiture: cable
companies will sell their interests in RSNs to avoid the FCC's
discrimination regulations. It also allows for the possibility that a cable
company could be commercially viable under the FCC's current
regulations, even with an expanded basic tier that is bloated with expensive
sports programming.
The problem with the non-interventionist approach is that, if cable
companies do not divest and are able to remain financially viable, some
current subscribers may not be able to afford to maintain access to cable at
higher prices. Whether the decrease in access to cable television would be
significant enough to justify intervention is an empirical question that,
before it could be answered, would require knowledge of, among other
things, how much the prices could rise. The adoption of a non-
interventionist approach seems unlikely however, if for no other reason
than the fact that it is unlikely to work quickly.
B. A la Carte
The importance of carriage on a basic/expanded service tier is a
consequence of the current method of cable regulation which requires cable
companies to offer expanded basic service tiers. There is a movement that
advocates permitting subscribers to purchase cable channels (or specialized
bundles of those channels) A la carte. 0
110. See, e.g., Cesar Conda, Cable 6 la Carte?, NAT'L REVIEW ONLINE, Jan. 12, 2006,
http://www.nationalreview.com/nrofcomment/conda200601120906.asp; Press Release,
Gene Kimmelman, Statement of Gene Kimmelman in Response to FCC Chairman Kevin
Martin's Support for Cable "A la Carte" Pricing Before the Senate Commerce Committee's
Summit on Decency in the Media, Nov. 29, 2005, available at
http://www.consumerunion.org/pub/core-telecom-and-utilities/002902.html.
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The merits of cable A la carte are beyond the scope of this Note, but it
is worthwhile to point out that moving to an A la carte system would
probably moot any controversy over discrimination between cable-owned
RSNs and other sports networks. Currently, the financial viability of
nonaffiliated sports networks is partially dependant on gaining carriage on
the expanded basic tier of service.' The object of the game, therefore, is
not necessarily to be viewed by a large audience, but to obtain carriage on
the basic service tier.'
12
In an A la carte regime, there would presumably be no "basic" tier, so
the incentive to misuse the FCC's discrimination rules would be destroyed.
That is not to say that there would be no tiers. Any A la carte regime would
likely include a tiering system of some sort.1 3 Assuming that one method
of tiering could be theme-based, there would likely be a sports tier. If cable
companies remain vertically integrated, there remains a potential for
discrimination between affiliated RSNs, and other nonaffiliated sports
networks.
One could easily argue that an i la carte system is no solution at all if
it simply leads to more discrimination issues. But one of the fundamental
problems with the present discrimination regime is that increases in cable
prices that result from sports programming affect all customers, not just
sports fans. In an i la carte system, only sports fans would be faced with
price hikes that would presumably result from the potential inability of
vertically integrated cable companies to deny tier placement to
nonaffiliated networks. Even if an i la carte regime does not completely
eliminate the problem caused by the FCC's discrimination regulations, it
limits the impact of the problem on consumers.
Former FCC Commissioner Kevin Martin has strongly supported a
move to i la carte pricing, citing it as a way to decrease cable bills and
decrease the amount of indecent content that is generally included with
111. See Greg Johnson, NFL Calls Screen Play, or Is It an End Around, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2007, at DI, available at http://www.mediaaccess.org/news/2007%
20News/I 118LATimes.pdf.
112. This assumption is based on the fact that a cable network receives a per subscriber
fee for carriage. I assume, based on the prices received by networks like ESPN and YES
compared with CNN (see supra notes 3-5), that the price a network is able to charge is
based more on the value of the advertising it is able to attract rather than the absolute
number of people who watch the network. Thus, because advertisers value sports
programming, sports channels can obtain a high price for carriage despite the fact that they
do not necessarily have high ratings. A sports network is, therefore, concerned with (1) the
value of its audience to advertisers, and (2) the number of subscribers for which it can
charge the cable company.
113. Hazlett, supra note 13, at 255, 257-58 (2006).
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cable subscriptions." 4 The cable industry argues that an i la carte system
would not save consumers money, and that the current system provides a
diversity of programming at a reasonable price."' Some analysts say that i
la carte would not lower prices without price regulation by the FCC;" 6 this
may damper some enthusiasm for making the move among free-market
enthusiasts. So far, the cable industry has been successful at stalling any
change.' '7 At this point, it remains unclear whether the FCC will be able to
muster support to make a move to an A la carte cable regime.
C. Add a Procedure That Allows Cable Companies to Seek
Dismissal of a Complaint if Discrimination Between Networks is
Reasonable
Since the initial review for a prima facie case seems to drive the
outcome of settlements of discrimination complaints, the best way to alter
the outcome of those settlements might be to change the complaint process.
The FCC's unwillingness to define exactly what types of discrimination are
prohibited,' 18 and its TCR v. Comcast holding that discrimination is
unreasonable if it would cause the nonaffiliated network to be financially
infeasible" 9 do not lead to carriage agreements that are in the public
interest.
The reason that some discrimination by cable companies toward
league-owned sports networks is reasonable is that it will control the price
of cable on the expanded basic tier, and there will still be an ample amount
and diversity of sports programming. If sports league-owned networks are
able to use the discrimination rules the way that TCR did, it will lead to
increases in the price of cable for the vast majority of people who are not
ardent sports fans (as discussed above).
114. See Ted Hearn, McDowell's Doubts: FCC Member Has Reservations About A La
Carte, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Feb. 4, 2008, at 18, available at 2008 WLNR 2096995
(Westlaw); Ted Hearn, 'War on Cable' Cited in Court, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Feb. 11,
2008, at 18, available at 2008 WLNR 2624941 (Westlaw).
115. See Evan Hessel & Dorothy Pomerantz, The People vs. Comcast, FORBES.COM, Jan.
28, 2008, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0128/076_print.html.
116. See Ted Hearn, The Winds of Change: Potential Reform of the FCC Could go in
Many Directions, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 28, 2008, at 37, available at 2008 WLNR
1614821 (Westlaw).
117. See Hessel & Pomerantz, supra note 115.
118. Competition and Diversity in Video Distribution and Carriage, supra note 38, at
para. 17.
119. TCR Order, supra note 36, at para. 11.
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The 1992 Cable Act only prohibits competition that unreasonably
restrains the ability of an unaffiliated network to compete.120 The current
method of prima facie review does not give sufficient weight to the
reasonableness of discrimination. As discussed above, the FCC's prima
facie review does not give the defendant the opportunity to seek dismissal
of the complaint as a matter of law.
Because of the important role of the FCC's initial review of
discrimination complaints, it is important that there is a mechanism in place
that allows the defendant to demur to the complaint on the basis that, even
if there is discrimination between affiliated and nonaffiliated networks, the
discrimination is reasonable. This procedural change would give the FCC
the ability to fulfill its statutory duty in the initial prima facie review by
weighing the impact of the provider's action on the network's ability to
compete against countervailing considerations which might make the
discrimination reasonable under the circumstances.1
2 1
Some convincing arguments that discrimination by the cable
company is reasonable under the circumstances might include (1) that the
nonaffiliated network is seeking carriage on an basic expanded tier at a
price that would cause a significant increase in price for subscribers, (2)
that the nonaffiliated network serves a small niche audience and does not
justify the per subscriber price it is seeking, (3) that the affiliated network
that the cable company is discriminating in favor of is not a competitor of
the unaffiliated network, 122 or (4) that the type of programming the
nonaffiliated network would provide is already widely available in the
expanded basic tier of cable service. If the FCC concluded that these
considerations or others outweighed any adverse impact on the ability of
the unaffiliated network to compete, the FCC would dismiss the complaint.
The downfall of this approach is that it would create a procedure that
could drag out the complaint process. The FCC has a statutory duty to
expedite review of complaints filed by networks. 23 But, as discussed
above, a dismissal procedure would further the statutory purpose of
prohibiting only unreasonable discrimination and the procedure need not be
unduly time-consuming. The positive impact of a dismissal procedure on
carriage negotiations probably would justify the additional time it would
take to review a complaint.
120. 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(3) (2000); accord47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(a) (2008).
121. See § 536(a)(3).
122. For example, suppose the cable company owned an RSN that covered a
professional baseball team and the nonaffiliated network focused on fall and winter college
sports. The networks would not be in competition for viewers, thus, not competitors.
123. § 536(a)(4) (Such regulations shall "provide for expedited review of any complaints
made by a video programming vendor pursuant to this section.").
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D. Mandatory Arbitration is Not a Reasonable Solution for All
Carriage Disputes
The NFL Network has lobbied for mandatory arbitration in carriage
disputes to resolve disputes in carriage negotiations. 24 The NFL's
argument is that mandatory arbitration is required because "market failure
has imposed substantial burdens on consumers, who are unable to access
popular programming, including games of their favorite sports teams.' 25
The NFL Network asserted that imposing mandatory arbitration in disputes
between cable companies and networks is not unprecedented; this is what
the FCC forced TCR and Comcast to do in its TCR Order decision.
26
The NFL Network's comparison to the TCR case is inaccurate; the
TCR decision concluded that TCR had made a prima facie case that
Comcast had discriminated in favor of its own RSN. So if the FCC
effectively forced arbitration in that case, it did so in response to an
allegation of discrimination. The NFL Network's proposal is much more
intrusive into the negotiation process, and would require arbitration in all
carriage disputes, not just disputes involving discrimination.
Mandatory arbitration in all carriage disputes is a remedy that is too
broad given the scope of the problem. If this policy was adopted, it would
involve government intrusion in business negotiations without any showing
that the cable company is denying carriage based on its market power or is
discriminating in favor of its own vertically integrated networks. It is
difficult to see how this would be justified. It would also encourage entities
like the NFL Network to demand a high carriage price and create a dispute
to get cable companies to submit to arbitration. While mandatory
arbitration could be justified with a showing of discrimination or abuse of
market power, it would be difficult to justify when there is no such abuse.
While it would be unwise to subject parties to mandatory arbitration
in every carriage dispute, it might be a good idea to make this the normal
remedy when a complainant has successfully proven discrimination (or
other abuse of market power prohibited by statute). 127 The FCC's order
implementing the carriage regulation statutes stated that remedies would be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 128 Among the remedies available
include "forfeitures, mandatory carriage, or carriage on terms revised or
124. See Make, supra note 91.
125. Ted Hearn, NFL Network Wants Legislators to Back Cable Fight, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6511245.html.
126. Id.
127. See 47 U.S.C. § 536 (2000).
128. Competition and Diversity in Video Distribution and Carriage, supra note 38, at
para. 26.
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specified by the [FCC]."'2 9 In litigation, the stakes over these regulations
seem high. If the remedy was usually arbitration, parties that were in a
position that might now result in litigation might be more willing to submit
to arbitration before engaging in litigation. While this would be a desirable
outcome, it would not be desirable to force every dispute into government-
mandated arbitration.
VI. CONCLUSION
Televised sports programming is an important aspect of American
culture. The attention paid to the dispute between cable companies and
league-owned sports networks by politicians, the media, and the general
public certainly reflects this. But for every Hoosiers fan in Bloomington,
Indiana that would gladly pay an extra couple dollars a month to have the
Big Ten Network, there is a political junkie, a Lifetime movie fan, and a
history buff, that could not care less. In a world where both cable
companies and sports leagues are pursuing vertical integration strategies by
creating or acquiring cable sports networks, the FCC's anti-discrimination
carriage regulations over-serve sports fans, and under-serve (and over-
charge) everyone else.
Policymakers have several options that would address the problem
with the current regulations. The FCC could revise its complaint process to
allow a defendant cable network to seek dismissal of a complaint if it is
able to show that any alleged discrimination is reasonable under the
circumstances. This would allow the FCC to determine whether the
discrimination is actually inconsistent with the public interest, and thus
prohibited by statute. The FCC should not adopt mandatory arbitration in
all carriage disputes; this would be an unjustified interference with business
negotiations in a free market. Other policies that could resolve the problem
with the current carriage regulations would be a move to an A la carte cable
regime, or to encourage (or require) cable companies to divest themselves
of RSNs.
129. Id.
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